Part 3: The Changing Threat Landscape in OT Environments

In previous posts of this series, we explored the business rationale behind IT/OT convergence and examined real-world use cases across key industries. It has become evident that OT systems are no longer isolated, and securing them is imperative for maintaining cyber hygiene, ensuring core business continuity, adhering to regulations, and safeguarding safety.

In this third installment, we will focus on the threats themselves. To develop a robust OT security strategy, it is essential to comprehend the challenges involved and the limitations of traditional IT security approaches.

The Myth of the Air Gap: A False Sense of Security

For many years, OT environments operated under the assumption of safety through isolation. In industrial operations, critical infrastructure such as plants, substations, pipelines, and industrial sites is often “air-gapped,” meaning they have no direct internet connection. This has led to a concerning belief: “If it is not connected, it cannot be attacked.”

However, the concept of air gaps is increasingly becoming a myth.

Today’s OT systems are inherently integrated with IT networks. The introduction of remote access for support teams, centralized monitoring, cloud-based analytics and mobile visibility has made the physical and logical separation that once defined OT virtually impossible.

Even when air gaps are still in place, attackers often find creative ways to circumvent them, using infected USB drives, compromised laptops, or improperly segmented networks. The assumption that OT environments are inherently safe is outdated and actively exploited.

Who’s Attacking OT Systems—And Why?

Contemporary OT threats are not the sole purview of individual hackers working from home. The current threat landscape is characterized by sophisticated and well-resourced adversaries with a variety of motives:

1. Cybercriminals (Financially Motivated)

Ransomware groups have identified that targeting OT systems or even threatening to do so can expedite the extraction of substantial ransom payments. In contrast to conventional IT targets, the operational impact of shutting down a factory, power grid, or logistics hub can lead to immediate business disruptions.

Notable examples:

Colonial Pipeline (2021) – An IT-side ransomware attack led to the shutdown of pipeline operations.
Norsk Hydro (2019) – A ransomware attack halted aluminum production, costing the company over $50 million.

2. Nation-State Actors (Geopolitical Motives)

State-sponsored groups regard OT systems as high-value targets in cyber warfare, espionage, or strategic disruption. Attacks on critical infrastructure can undermine adversaries without the need for traditional warfare.

Examples include:

Industroyer/CrashOverride (Ukraine, 2016) – Disrupted power grid operations in Kyiv.
Stuxnet (Iran, 2010) – The first known cyber weapon, designed to sabotage nuclear centrifuges.

3. Hacktivists & Extremists (Ideological Motives)

Certain activist groups or individuals may target infrastructure for ideological or political reasons, especially if it aligns with causes such as environmental activism, anti-corporate sentiment, or anti-government protest.

4. Insiders (Accidental or Malicious)

Employees, contractors, or partners accessing OT systems can pose unintentional or deliberate risks. A misconfigured firewall or an unauthorized USB device can create a vulnerability that could result in a significant breach.

How OT Attacks Differ From IT Attacks

While some attack vectors overlap between IT and OT, the consequences in OT environments are fundamentally different and far more severe in many cases.

Aspect	IT Security	OT Security
Primary Concern	Data loss, confidentiality	System uptime, physical safety
Downtime Tolerance	Hours or days	Often minutes—or not acceptable at all
Asset Lifecycle	3–5 years	10–30+ years
Patch Management	Frequent, automated	Rare, manual, and often avoided due to system criticality
Attack Consequences	Financial loss, reputational damage	Physical harm, production shutdown, environmental risk

OT environments include safety-critical systems such as pumps, pressure valves, power relays, and centrifuges. Attacks on these systems can result in physical damage, injury, or even loss of life. Therefore, OT security becomes a board-level and societal concern, not just a technical risk.

Attack Vectors: How Do Threats Enter OT Environments?

Understanding how attackers get into OT environments is crucial to defending them. Common entry points include:

Compromised IT systems that are connected to OT networks (e.g., via shared infrastructure or remote access tools)
Third-party access by vendors, contractors, or system integrators
Legacy systems with unpatched vulnerabilities (often due to unsupported hardware/software)
USB drives or portable devices used by on-site staff or technicians
Misconfigured firewalls or insufficient segmentation between IT and OT zones
Phishing attacks that gain initial access and pivot into OT networks via lateral movement

Notably, many attacks do not originate in OT but migrate there from IT environments. This underscores the importance of having end-to-end visibility and unified threat detection across both domains.

Emerging Threats and Trends

As OT environments evolve, so do threats. Key trends to watch include:

Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) in OT: Groups increasingly develop ransomware strains targeting industrial systems or SCADA interfaces.

Deepfakes and Social Engineering: Sophisticated impersonation of executives or operators can trick teams into making dangerous system changes.

AI-driven Attacks: Adversaries are beginning to use AI to identify weak points in networks quickly, automate lateral movement, or generate malicious code at scale.

Supply Chain Attacks: Vulnerabilities in third-party software or hardware used in OT (e.g., embedded systems or HMI platforms) are increasingly exploited.

Why Traditional IT Security Alone Isn’t Enough

Many organizations attempt to protect OT environments by applying the same tools and playbooks used in IT. This often results in limited effectiveness and operational risk. For example:

An endpoint detection tool designed for Windows 11 PCs may crash a legacy PLC running a proprietary OS.
Frequent patching cycles expected by IT may be impossible in 24/7 critical infrastructure.
Centralized identity management may not align with isolated OT operator stations and HMIs.

Instead, OT security requires tailored approaches, such as:

Passive network monitoring (to avoid interference)
Protocol-aware threat detection (Modbus, DNP3, etc.)
Role-based access controls for engineers and vendors
Secure remote access that isolates sessions and logs every action

Looking Ahead: Building the Right Architecture

Understanding the threat landscape is necessary, but it’s not the destination. Organizations must now design security architectures that are fit for OT realities: segmented, monitored, governed, and operationally sustainable.

That’s precisely what we’ll explore in Part 4 of this series. We’ll unpack OT security architecture—from zone models and segmentation to asset discovery, visibility, and access control.

Defensive against threats isn’t just about technology. It’s about building a resilient architecture that works with the limitations and priorities of OT environments, not against them.